In political environments, the process of developing new policies often involves competing factions or entrepreneurs, who make productive investments to make their proposals more appealing to decisionmakers. The ideologies and abilities of these factions is often highly asymmetric, e.g., competition over industrial policy between interest groups and consumer advocacy organizations. In this paper we extend the competitive policy development model of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) to understand productive policy competition between asymmetric entrepreneurs, and analyze how entrepreneurs' extremism and costs of crafting high-quality proposals affect patterns of competition and policy outcomes. We show that with arbitrary asymmetries the model exhibits a unique equilibrium, and analytically characterize equilibrium strategies, outcomes, and payoffs. We also show that a more ideologically extreme or more skilled entrepreneur is more likely to develop a policy, develops more extreme policies, and is more likely to win. Nevertheless, she also provides greater benefits to the decisionmaker once her proposals' endogenously-chosen quality is accounted for. Finally, when the entrepreneurs are highly asymmetric, one entrepreneur almost always wins, but the decisionmaker nevertheless benefits from the potential for competition.
Introduction
In political organizations, the process of developing new policies typically involves competing actors with differing objectives and abilities. For example, a legislature considering major legislation will often solicit competing bills from committee chairmen with substantially differing ideologies, as was the case within both the House and the Senate during drafting of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) . Legislatures also routinely consider competing proposals from opposing interest groups like trade associations and consumer advocacy groups, who may be equally ideologically extreme but have highly asymmetric resources. In bureaucratic politics, each subunit within a government agency may develop its own proposal for consideration by the agency head, and these subunits typically have differing funding levels and staff expertise. Finally, this pattern is not restricted to the public sector; on the contrary, many NGOs, universities, and firms have different factions within them that exert effort to craft competing proposals that they hope will be implemented.
We use the term "policy entrepreneur" to refer to an individual, faction, or interest group that takes the initiative to develop a policy, without any guarantee that it will be adopted. Of course, policy entrepreneurs often disagree-both with each other and with decisionmakersabout a variety of things. These disagreements may be ideological, or they may be about the organization's mission and the relative importance of different objectives. Yet despite their disagreements, people in a political organization usually have some interests in common.
To the extent that there are overarching organizational goals, they (ceteris paribus) prefer policies that more effectively achieve them. When possible they prefer to save money, or to make money in the case of a for-profit firm. And, other things being equal, they prefer to enhance the organization's status and prestige.
In this paper we seek to understand policy competition between entrepreneurs who are asymmetric, because of differing degrees of ideological extremism, differing abilities at developing policy proposals, or both. To do so, we generalize the competitive policy development model of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) , which in turn builds on previous research on all-pay contests (e.g., Che & Gale (2003) , Siegel (2009) ). The foundation of the model two-fold. First, there is a continuous policy space with two dimensions: an ideological dimension over which players have different preferences, and a quality dimension that is common value. Second, the participants in the contest, i.e., the entrepreneurs, are fundamentally policy motivated-they care about the ideology and quality of the policy that is ultimately implemented, and their motive for winning is purely instrumental. The model thus features what Baye, Kovenock & Vries (2012) term second order rank order spillovers; the utility of the second-ranked playeri.e. the loser -depends directly on the policy that the winner development. Baye, Kovenock & Vries (2012) develop a symmetric, unidimensional model to use to analyze auctions, R&D contests, litigation, and price competition. The spillovers in our model are more complex, however, because the entrepreneurs care about, and make choices on, both the ideological dimension and the quality dimension. Our model is thus more appropriate for analyzing policy development in political organizations.
The sequence of the model is as follows. Two competing policy entrepreneurs simultaneously choose specific ideological locations at which to develop policies, and also how much to invest in producing quality. Each entrepreneur has an ideal ideological outcome x i and marginal cost of developing quality α i . Their investments are costly and cannot be combined or transferred to other policies. A decisionmaker with an ideal ideological outcome x D = 0 located between them chooses one of the entrepreneurs' proposals or a "reservation policy" that is already available to the decisionmaker. The decisionmaker can neither commit exante to a decision rule, nor pay the entrepreneurs to reward them for developing particular policies. Rather, he must simply choose among the available options. This assumption reflects the fact that leaders in many political organizations have access to a very-limited set of rewards and punishments (Moe 1984) , and that commitment is often difficult or impossible.
To gain the support of the decisionmaker, the entrepreneurs use a combination of ideological concessions and productive quality investments. The primary reason an entrepreneur invests in quality is to reduce her need to make ideological concessions. As shown in Hirsch & Shotts (2015) , an important intermediate result that applies to both the symmetric and asymmetric model is that ideologically-extreme policies are not bad for a centrist decisionmaker in equilibrium -when extreme policies are developed, they are sufficiently high quality to overcompensate the decisionmaker for his ideological losses.
We first show that equilibria are in two-dimensional mixed strategies. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, and show that strategies are characterized by a univariate probability distribution over the decisionmaker's utility, combined with simple functions associating each utility with a unique combination of ideology and quality. The equilibrium probability distributions are characterized by a straightforward system of differential equations. Next, we show that equilibria always exist and are unique, and we provide an analytical characterization of equilibrium strategies and players' payoffs.
In Hirsch & Shotts (2015) it is shown that with symmetric participants, the unique equilibrium is symmetric, both entrepreneurs always enter the contest, and they each win with equal probability. The decisionmaker always benefits from joint increases in the ideological extremism of the entrepreneurs or in their abilities, even though greater extremism of the resulting policies is exhibited as a byproduct. Finally, the entrepreneurs sometimes benefit, and are sometimes harmed, by common increases in their skill at policy development.
In this paper, we show that for generic asymmetric parameters, participation in the contest is asymmetric; one entrepreneur is more engaged, i.e., she enters the contest with probability 1, whereas the other one sometimes sits out. The probability that the lessengaged entrepreneur sits out is a function of the two entrepreneurs' preferences and costs, and for extremely asymmetric values of these parameters it converges to 1. However, this does not imply that the model functions as if the less-engaged entrepreneur did not exist (in which case the more-engaged entrepreneur could extract all quality benefits for herself, in the form of ideological rents). Rather, the seldom (and in the limit never) realized entry of the less-engaged entrepreneur induces the more-engaged entrepreneur to develop policies that strictly benefit the decisionmaker, even in the limit.
We also show that the more-engaged entrepreneur may not dominate the contest. Rather, if she is more ideologically-extreme yet faces a sufficiently large cost disadvantage, her opponent is more likely to win the contest, despite being less likely to enter. On the other hand, if the more-engaged entrepreneur is both more ideologically-extreme and more cost-effective at developing quality, then compared to her opponent she will develop policies that are (in a first-order stochastic sense) more extreme and also better for the decisionmaker. Finally, the model yields intuitive comparative statics. Each entrepreneur is worse off when her opponent's costs decrease. Lower costs make it cheaper to develop any given level of quality, and thus easier to realize ideological gains. As an entrepreneur's costs decrease, she develops more-extreme policies, and her opponent develops more moderate ones. The effect of increasing one entrepreneur's ideological extremism is, for the most part, similar to decreasing her costs: her policies become more extreme, her opponent's policies become moderate, and her opponent is worse off.
Literature The canonical approach to studying the endogenous development of highquality policies is Crawford & Sobel's (1982) model, in which experts acquire information about an unknown state of the world. Such models have been widely applied within political science to study the institutional determinants of high-quality policies (Gailmard & Patty 2012) . They also feature information that is effectively transferable across policies, a property that (Callander 2008) terms "invertibility" and criticizes for being unrealistic.
Our model instead assumes that quality is endogenous, common knowledge, and policyspecific (Ting 2011 , Hirsch & Shotts 2012 . It is thus better suited to empirical domains in which information and expertise are not readily transferable across different approaches to the same organizational problem.
1 For example, information about how to design an effective and equitable school voucher program cannot be used to improve the quality of public schools. Similarly, when one division within a firm develops a new product, this doesn't help another division that is developing a completely different product that it wants the firm to focus on. Or, if we consider adoption of a "policy" to be the election of a particular party to control the government, then a party that makes productive investments in its own capacity to govern-e.g., by developing a well thought-out platform or by improving recruitment and training of its candidates and bureaucrats-knows that the benefits of its investments are only realized in the event that it actually wins office.
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Because quality is policy-specific in our model, an entrepreneur does not need to worry about being expropriated, but rather attempts to exploit her investments to encourage the decisionmaker to select her policy. This effect is akin to Aghion & Tirole's (1997) 
The Model
We analyze a two-stage game of policy development and choice played by two competing entrepreneurs and a decisionmaker. Policies in the model have two components: ideology y ∈ R and quality q ∈ [0, ∞) = R + . Thus, a policy is a point in a subset of two-dimensional real space, b = (y, q) ∈ R × R + = B. Players' utility functions U i (b) over the two dimensions are additive, and quality is valued equally by all players:
2 where x i denotes player i s ideological ideal point. We assume without loss of generality that the decisionmaker's ideal ideology is x D = 0, and furthermore assume that the two entrepreneurs are on strictly opposite sides of the decisionmaker, i.e., x L < 0 < x R .
In the policy development stage, each entrepreneur i ∈ {L, R} simultaneously develops a policy b i = (y i , q i ) ∈ B with ideology y i and quality q i ≥ 0. We assume for simplicity that the cost of developing quality q i is c i (q i ) = α i q i where α i > 1. Thus, the cost is linear and independent of ideology y i , and policies with 0 quality are costless. The net benefit of producing quality is (1 − α i ) q i < 0, so an entrepreneur will only develop quality to increase the probability that her policy will be selected.
In the policy choice stage, the decisionmaker chooses from the set of newly-developed policies b ∈ B 2 or a reservation policy b 0 = (0, 0), i.e., the decisionmaker's ideal ideology with 0 quality. These assumptions capture the idea that the decisionmaker can choose freely from the 0-quality policies, and that quality is policy-specific (Hirsch & Shotts 2012).
As described in Hirsch & Shotts (2015) , the game is effectively a multidimensional all-pay contest (Che & Gale 2003 , Siegel 2009 , with two features that distinguish it from previous models. First, the entrepreneurs are policy motivated rather than rent seeking (as in Tullock (1980) and Baye, Kovenock & Vries (1993) . They care about which policies are implemented even if they lose, so the contest features what Baye, Kovenock & Vries (2012) refer to as rank order spillovers. Second, in the model the investments made to gain influence are productive,
and not simply transfers to the decisionmaker. These differences stem from the fact that the model is designed to apply to policy-motivated actors in political organizations, where people have both divergent ideological interests and common organizational interests.
Preliminary Analysis
We now introduce notation and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium.
This preliminary analysis applies to both the symmetric variant originally considered in Hirsch & Shotts (2015) as well as the asymmetric variant considered herein.
3
The model is a variant of an all-pay contest (Siegel 2009), with some distinctive properties.
As in Che & Gale (2003) the contest is multidimensional because policies (y i , q i ) are twodimensional. There is also a "score function" s (y i , q i ) that determines the winner. In our model, a policy's score is the utility it provides to the decisionmaker, so the score function
The reason is that the decisionmaker cannot commit in advance to which policy he will choose. Thus, he must always choose the policy with the strictly highest score (and may randomize arbitrarily in the event of ties).
Also like Che & Gale (2003) , there are a continuum of policies with different ideologies that have the same score. These policies have different costs to develop; a policy with ideology y and score s must have quality s + y 2 , so entrepreneur i's cost to develop it is α i (s + y 2 ). In addition, the policies are valued differently by different players; entrepreneur i's utility from policy (s, y) is U i (y, s + y 2 ) = −x 2 i + s + 2x i y. It is thus helpful to introduce notation for these quantities, which allow us to treat an entrepreneur's problem as the choice of a score curve s and an ideology y to develop along that score curve.
Definition 1 Player i's utility for a policy (s, y) with score s and ideology y is
The up-front cost to an entrepreneur of developing the policy herself is α i (s + y 2 ). For technical convenience we restrict attention to strategies generating score CDFs that can be written as the sum of an absolutely continuous and a discrete distribution. The decisionmaker is the last mover, so equilibrium requires that he choose a policy (s, y) with the maximum score. While a complete description also requires specifying his tie-breaking rules, equilibria are invariant to this decision so we omit the additional notation.
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium using a series of lemmas.
First, let Π i (s i , y i ; σ −i ) denote i's expected utility from developing policy (s i , y i ) (suppressing the dependence on the DM's tie-breaking rules). At any score s i > 0 where −i has no atom, this expected utility is equal to
Taking the first order condition with respect to y i yields the following essential Lemma.
Lemma 1 At any score s i > 0 where the score CDF F −i (·) of i's opponent has no atom, developing the policy (s i , y * i (s i )), where
is strictly better for i than developing any other policy (s i , y i ).
Lemma 1 states that for almost every score s i > 0, entrepreneur i's best combination of ideology y i and quality q i to generate that score is unique. Crucially, the optimal ideologyquality combination does not depend on the specific policies that her opponent develops.
Instead, it is simply
, a weighted average of the entrepreneur and decisionmaker's ideal ideologies, multiplied by the probability F −i (s i ) that her opponent develops a lowerscore policy.
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Second, we establish that in equilibrium there is 0 probability of a tie at a strictly positive score. The absence of "score ties" is an intuitive consequence of the all-pay nature of investing in quality-if an entrepreneur knew that her policy might tie with her opponent's policy or the reservation policy, she could invest up-front in a bit more quality to break the tie.
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Lemma 2 In equilibrium there is 0-probability of a tie at scores s > 0.
Third, having ruled out ties at strictly positive scores, we next show that one of the entrepreneurs must always be active, in the sense of developing a policy with score strictly higher than 0 (the score that can be achieved for free "developing" the reservation policy).
In other words, F k (0) > 0 for at most one k ∈ {L, R}, implying that k's opponent −k is always active (F −k (0) = 0).
Lemmas 1 -3 jointly imply that in equilibrium, player i can compute her expected utility as if her opponent always develops policies of the form s −i , y * −i (s −i ) . Thus, entrepreneur i's utility from developing any (s i , y i ) with s i > 0 where her opponent's score CDF F −i has no atom (or if a tie would be broken in her favor) can be written as
4 Lemma 1 is similar to Lemma 6 of Che & Gale (2003) , in which the problem is simplified to choosing a score, but the optimal way to achieve each score depends on the other player's score CDF.
5 Proving this property is more complex than in all-pay contests without spillovers, because the utility from tying can be a complicated function of the opponent's policies and the decisionmaker's decision rule.
Her utility from developing the best policy with score s i is Π * i (s i , y * i (s i ) ; F ), which we henceforth denote Π * i (s i ; F ). Fourth and finally, we show that equilibrium score CDFs must satisfy the following natural properties that arise from the all pay nature of the contest.
Lemma 4
The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over s ≥ 0 is common, convex, and includes 0. In addition, both CDFs are atomless ∀s > 0.
To conclude, we combine the preceding lemmas to state a preliminary characterization of all equilibria in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions. Proposition 1 A strategy profile σ is a SPNE i.f.f. it satisfies the following conditions. 
(Score Optimality)
The profile of score CDFs (F L , F R ) satisfy the following boundary conditions and differential equations.
• (Boundary Conditions) F k (0) > 0 for at most one entrepreneur k ∈ {L, R}, and there ∃s > 0 such that lim s→s {F i (s)} = 1 ∀i.
• (Differential Equations) For all i ∈ {L, R} and s ∈ [0, s] ,
Observations about Equilibria Proposition 1 implies that equilibria have a simple form.
First, at least one entrepreneur −k is always active -thus, competition always strictly benefits the decisionmaker. The other entrepreneur k may also always be active (F k (0) = 0) or be inactive with strictly positive probability (F k (0) > 0). Second, when either entrepreneur i is active, she mixes smoothly over the ideologically-optimal policies (s, y * i (s)) = s,
with scores in a common mixing interval [0,s] according to the CDF F i (s). 6 Technically, the proposition does not state that the support interval is also bounded (s < ∞), but this is later shown indirectly through the analytical equilibrium derivation.
The differential equations that must be satisfied by equilibrium score CDFs arise intuitively from the requirement that both entrepreneurs be indifferent over developing all ideologically-optimal policies with scores in [0, s] . The left hand side of each differential equation is i s net marginal cost of producing a higher-score policy, given a fixed probability F −i (s) of winning the contest; the entrepreneur pays marginal cost α i > 1 for sure, but with probability F −i (s) her policy is chosen and she enjoys a marginal benefit of 1 (because she values quality). The right hand side represents i s marginal ideological benefit of producing a higher score. Doing so increases by f −i (s) the probability that her policy wins, which changes the ideological outcome from her opponent's optimal ideology y * −i (s) =
at score s to her own optimal ideology y *
In addition, a robust feature of equilibria (also noted in Hirsch & Shotts (2015)) is that more-extreme policies are not merely higher-quality than less-extreme ones. They are also higher-score, so their additional quality overcompensates the decisionmaker for his ideological losses. The decisionmaker thus prefers the more ideologically-extreme policies in the support of each entrepreneur's strategy. This is a general property, which follows immediately from ideological optimality. If two policies (s i , y i ) and (s i , y i ) have scores s i < s i , the higherscore one wins the contest with higher probability
. Thus, the ideology
of the higher-score policy is more extreme than the ideology
of the lower-score one. Intuitively, a policy that gives greater utility to the decisionmaker will be paired with a more-extreme ideology because it has a higher chance of being selected, so the entrepreneur is more willing to pay the sure costs of developing quality for the uncertain benefits of ideological change.
Finally, certain aspects of the strategies are irrelevant for equilibrium. The first of these is the decisionmaker's tie-breaking rule; this is a consequence both of the absence of ties at positive scores, as well as the fact that one entrepreneur is always active. The second of these is the exact way that a sometimes inactive entrepreneur k (if one exists) is inactive. She could do so by "developing" the reservation policy with probability exactly equal to F k (0), i.e., having an atom at score 0. But she may also have an arbitrary CDF over scores s ≤ 0 generated by 0-quality proposals. The key thing is that she be "sometimes inactive" with 0-quality policies that are costless to develop, always lose the contest, and never influence a tie between her opponent (who is always active) and the reservation policy.
Symmetric Competition
Before proceeding with analysis of the asymmetric model, we first briefly review results from the symmetric baseline model (x ≡ |x i | and α ≡ α i ). Symmetric entrepreneurs yield a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is restated in the following corollary to Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) . 
The symmetric model yields the following comparative statics in the extremism of the entrepreneurs x and their costs of developing quality α, restated in the following corollary to Propositions 2 and 3 of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) .
• the decisionmaker always chooses the most extreme proposal presented
• as the entrepreneurs become more extreme (higher x) or more skilled (lower α), their proposals become first-order stochastically more extreme, but also first-order stochastically higher quality and better for the decisionmaker
• the entrepreneur's equilibrium utility is first decreasing and then increasing in α
The symmetric equilibrium thus has four key properties. First, the decisionmaker always chooses the more ideologically-extreme of the two proposals made, due to the combination of symmetry and the equilibrium association between extremism and score. Second, while more polarized entrepreneurs naturally produce more ideologically-extreme policies, they also invest more in quality due to their greater desire to win, which benefits the decisionmaker as a byproduct. Third, the effect of increasing the entrepreneurs' skill is similar to the effect of ideological polarization; more skilled entrepreneurs better exploit their abilities to achieve ideological gains, which results in extreme policy proposals, but also benefits the decisionmaker. Finally, the entrepreneurs may benefit from shared increases in their skill because of the greater quality produced (when α is sufficiently low), but may also be harmed because of the greater intensity of competition that results (when α is sufficiently high).
Asymmetric Competition
We now focus on the asymmetric model and fully characterize equilibria. One way to do this is to use Proposition 1 to numerically compute equilibrium score CDFs for particular parameter values. (We also note that the sequence of steps employed to derive Proposition 1 can also be used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for variants of the model with alternative functional forms and payoff assumptions better suited to other applications.) The right entrepreneur's policies are better for the decisionmaker in a first-order stochastic sense; we later show that this property is a general feature of the game with symmetric ideologies and asymmetric costs.
The bottom panel depicts the ideological locations and qualities of the policies over which each entrepreneur mixes -that is, a parametric plot of y *
The ideological locations each entrepreneur i's policies extend out to
, which is the policy she would develop absent competition. The right entrepreneur exploits her cost advantage to develop more ideologically-extreme policies at every score, and overall her policies are first-order stochastically more extreme. This is a general feature of symmetric ideologies paired with asymmetric costs. 0.8 
Analytical Characterization
While Proposition 1 can be used to numerically compute score CDFs satisfying the equilibrium conditions, analyzing the model in this fashion ensures neither existence nor uniqueness.
However, it turns out both properties always hold, up to the inconsequential decision which 0-quality policies the sometimes-inactive entrepreneur k develops. That is, the equilibrium score CDFs are unique over positive scores s ≥ 0, and for negative scores (generated by 0-quality policies) their exact shape is irrelevant. Moreover, the unique equilibrium score
CDFs have an analytical characterization even with arbitrary asymmetries. We now provide this characterization, describe how to compute closed form expressions for key equilibrium properties, and analytically prove many properties of the resulting equilibria.
Proposition 2 Define the following notation.
•
which is a function that decreases from i (0) =
• Denote entrepreneur i's engagement at probability 0 with i , and let k denote the lessengaged entrepreneur at probability 0.
1 |x i | denote the unique probability such that i's engagement is equal to .
Then the unique score CDFs over s ≥ 0 satisfying Proposition 1 are
The unique equilibrium score CDFs F * i , F * −i can be understood through the function
, which we call entrepreneur i's engagement at probability p. This quantity captures an entrepreneur's willingness to develop policies whose probability of winning the contest is ≥ p, and is strictly decreasing in p. Whether an entrepreneur always enters the contest or sometimes sits out depends on her engagement at probability 0, i.e. i (0). We henceforth denote this quantity as simply i , and refer to it as entrepreneur i's engagement in the contest, or just her engagement. For the remainder of the paper we also denote the less engaged entrepreneur using subscript k. In equilibrium, the less engaged entrepreneur k mixes between entering and not entering the contest, i.e., F k (0) > 0 if k < −k . The more-engaged entrepreneur −k always enters the contest (F −k (0) = 0).
To understand the equilibrium construction, observe that when entrepreneur i develops a policy at score s, the probability that she wins the contest is F −i (s). Thus, her willingness to develop policies with score ≥ s is equal to i (F −i (s)), which is decreasing in s. The key property of equilibrium is that the entrepreneurs must be equally engaged at each score
Thus, in equilibrium every score s ∈ [0,s] is associated with a unique level of engagement * (s) that is common to both entrepreneurs. Proposition 2 analytically characterizes the inverse of this function, which is uniquely pinned down by the boundary conditions on
It is necessarily decreasing in s, because higher scores must be associated with a greater probability of winning, and hence lower engagement.
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The main equilibrium quantities are then easily derived from the following:
* (s) , the equilibrium engagement associated with each score s; i (p), entrepreneur i's engagement when she wins the contest with probability p; and p i ( ), i s probability of winning that yields engagement . The probability F * i (s) that entrepreneur i develops a policy with score ≤ s is the unique probability of winning the contest p −i ( * (s)) such that her competitor −i's engagement at score s is equal to * (s). Because i's optimal ideology is a linear function of her opponent's score CDF F −i (s) , i.e., y * i (s) =
Activity Proposition 2 yields a closed form expression for the probability each entrepreneur is active. Thus, we can analyze how the ideological extremism and costs of two competing factions determine the probability that each faction will develop a policy proposal. In particular, we consider how one faction's costs and extremism affect the other's activity.
It is easy to verify from the inverse function s * ( ) that the engagement associated with score s = 0 is k , the engagement of the less-engaged entrepreneur k. Thus, the probability that entrepreneur i is inactive is F * i (0) = p −i ( k ), which gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium 1. the more-engaged entrepreneur −k is always active
7 Equilibrium may alternatively be expressed in closed form using the inverse of the score CDFs.
2. the less-engaged entrepreneur k is active with probability
3. the probability that the less engaged entrepreneur k is active is strictly increasing in her engagement k , strictly increasing in her opponent's costs α −k , and strictly decreasing in her opponent's extremism |x −k |. Figure 4 is a contour plot of the probability that the less-engaged entrepreneur is active as a function of the ideology x R and costs α R of the right entrepreneur, holding fixed the left entrepreneur's parameters (x L , α L ). The white curve depicts where the two entrepreneurs are equally engaged, and hence always active. In the purple region, the right entrepreneur is less engaged. Here, decreases in her costs α R or increases in her ideological extremism
x R increase her engagement and thus the probability that she develops a policy. In the blue region, in contrast, the right entrepreneur is more engaged and thus is always active.
However, her parameters (α R , x R ) influence the probability that the left entrepreneur will be active. Decreases in the right entrepreneur's costs or increases in her extremism accentuate the imbalance in engagement, and decrease the probability that the left entrepreneur will develop a proposal. This comparative static is somewhat surprising given that (as we later show) more-extreme entrepreneurs develop more-extreme policies, which seemingly could
give the less-engaged entrepreneur a greater incentive to develop a competing proposal.
Overall, the probability of observing direct competition -that is, both entrepreneurs developing a strictly positive-quality policy -depends on how evenly the two entrepreneurs are engaged in the contest. As their engagement becomes increasingly asymmetric, the less-engaged one increasingly drops out.
Relative Strength Proposition 2 and the engagement equality in Equation 3 allow us to characterize the probability that an entrepreneur i wins the contest. In terms of score functions, it is s 0
Applying the engagement equality gives s 0
ds, while performing a change of variables (and recalling that F i (0) = p −i ( k )) yields the following result.
Corollary 4 The probability that entrepreneur i wins the contest is
which is strictly increasing in her ideological extremism |x i | and her opponent's costs α −i , and strictly decreasing in her costs α i and her opponent's ideological extremism |x −i |. Thus, each entrepreneur's probability of victory responds naturally to changes in the model's parameters. As either entrepreneur becomes more ideologically motivated or better able to develop quality, her probability of winning increases and her opponent's correspondingly decreases. Note that it is straightforward to evaluate the integral and write the expression in reduced form, but the comparative statics are less transparent.
We can also apply Equation 3's engagement equality to characterize when the moreengaged entrepreneur score-dominates the policy contest, developing policies that are firstorder stochastically better for the decisionmaker.
Proposition 3 The more-engaged entrepreneur −k score-dominates the contest, i.e., F −k (s) < F k (s) ∀s ∈ [0,s), if and only if she is more engaged at every probability p, i.e.,
Being more-engaged at probability 0, and thus more likely to enter the contest, is necessary but not sufficient for entrepreneur −k to score-dominate the contest. Intuitively, the reason is that the entrepreneurs place some intrinsic value on quality. Relative cost advantages become magnified when an entrepreneur develops higher-score policies, which are more likely to be chosen and thus give the entrepreneur the direct benefits of her quality investment. Mathematically, if entrepreneur −k has higher costs (α −k > α k ), then greater engagement at probability 0, i.e.,
, is an easier hurdle to satisfy than greater engagement at higher probabilities, i.e.,
Ideology An important question is how ideologically extreme are the policies that the entrepreneurs develop. Proposition 2 can be used to generate analytical characterizations of i's average ideological location E [y i ] as well as her full probability distribution over ideologies.
The model can therefore predict how factions in an organization alter the ideology of their proposals in response to changes in the underlying parameters of competition.
The average ideological location can be derived using our previous results. In terms of score CDFs, it is s 0
is equal to
Pr (i wins).
To derive the full CDF over i's policies, observe that the probability G (|y i |) that i develops a policy less ideologically extreme than y i is equal to the probability F i y −1 −i (y i ) that i develops a score s less than y −1 −i (y i ). This probability can in turn be derived analytically in two steps. First, the probability that i's opponent −i develops a policy with score less than 
Corollary 5 The average ideology of entrepreneur i's policies is E [y
The ideological extremism |y i | of entrepreneur i's policies is distributed according to
x −i , which is first-order stochastically increasing in i's ideological extremism |x i |, decreasing in her costs α i , decreasing in her opponent's ideological extremism |x −i |, and increasing in her opponent's costs α i . Unsurprisingly, when an entrepreneur's extremism |x i | increases or her costs α i decrease, she reacts by increasing the ideological extremism of her policies. In the former case she is more motivated to exploit quality to realize ideological gains, and in the latter case she is better able to do so. More interestingly, each entrepreneur reacts to increases in her opponent's ideological extremism |x i | and decreases in her opponent's costs α i by moderating the ideological location of her own policies. Thus, increased ideological extremism by one faction is necessarily accompanied by greater moderation from the competing faction. Our result that the cost-advantaged entrepreneur develops more-extreme policies contrasts sharply with Groseclose's (2001) model of electoral competition, which predicts that the higher-quality candidate chooses a moderate ideological platform. However, it is similar to Lax and Cameron's result that more-skillful opinion writers on the Supreme Court will write more-ideological opinions. The reason for the difference is that Groseclose assumes quality to be exogenous, so a candidate can only mitigate the effect of a pre-existing disadvantage or make use of a pre-existing advantage. In contrast, in our model (as well as Lax and Cameron's) quality is endogenous, and the benefit to entrepreneur i of having a lower cost α i is that she finds it easier to craft high-quality policy proposals that are noncentrist yet still appealing to the decisionmaker.
Payoffs We last characterize the players' payoffs. Proposition 2 yields a closed form characterization of the maximum scores; since F * i (s) = 1 = p −i (1), the maximum score is simply the score s * (1) associated with an engagement of 1. An entrepreneur's equilibrium utility is equal to her utility Π * i (s; F * ) from developing the maximum scores, since it is in the support of her strategy. 8 Also, since the CDF of the winning score max {s i , s −i } is the product of the score CDFs F * i (s) F * −i (s), the decisionmaker's equilibrium utility is
ds. This is straightforward to compute by again applying the engagement equality and a change of variables. Applying these insights yields the players' equilibrium utilities and comparative statics.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, 1. the maximum score iss = s
, which is increasing in ideological extremism |x i | and decreasing in costs α i for all i
entrepreneur i's utility is Π
s, which is decreasing in her opponent's extremism |x −i | and increasing in her opponent's costs α −i 3. the decisionmaker's utility is An entrepreneur's utility is written in terms of two components. The first component
i depends solely on her own parameters, and represents what her utility would be if she could engage in entrepreneurship absent competition. The second component − (α i − 1)s is the cost generated by competition, which forces her to develop policies that are strictly better for the decisionmaker than the reservation policy, in order to maintain her influence. This cost is increasing in i's marginal cost α i of developing quality, and increasing in the intensity of competition, as captured by the maximum scores.
The intensity of competitions is affected by the entire profile of parameters in a natural way. It increases if either entrepreneur becomes more extreme, or if either entrepreneur's costs of developing quality decrease.
An interesting implication is that an entrepreneur is worse off if her opponent becomes more willing or able to compete. In particular, an entrepreneur is harmed if her opponent becomes more efficient at developing quality, even though quality it is a fully common value dimension. The reason is that the downside of her opponent's ability to exploit quality to achieve noncentrist outcomes outweighs the spillover benefit of the additional quality. Our results on how −i s parameters affect i s utility are consistent with the casual observation, e.g., from the politics of academic departments, that a faction is often displeased when a competing faction becomes either more-motivated to exert effort on proposals that will shape the future direction of the organization, or more-effective at generating such proposals.
Special Cases
Even with an analytical characterization and few model parameters, the relationship between parameters and outcomes is complex. We thus conclude by considering three special cases of substantive interest: (i) an entrepreneur who is dominant, in the sense of having both moreextreme preferences and lower costs, (ii) entrepreneurs who are equally engaged but with different primary motives, where one has a cost advantage and the other is more ideologicallyextreme, and (iii) major asymmetries resulting from very high or low costs, or very moderate or extreme preferences. To do so we first provide a brief self-contained summary highlighting the main comparative statics from Corollaries 3-5 and Propositions 3 and 4.
Observation 1 As an entrepreneur i's costs α i decrease or her extremism |x i | increases, 1. her probability of winning the contest increases 2. her policies become FOS more extreme and her opponent's become FOS more moderate 3. her opponent's utility decreases.
Moreover, the probability that the less-engaged entrepreneur k is active decreases in her own costs α k and her opponent's ideological extremism |x −k |, and increases in her opponent's costs α −k and her own ideological extremism |x k |.
A key theme of the asymmetric model is that for many outcomes of interest, increasing an entrepreneur's extremism or reducing her costs has similar effects. Making an entrepreneur either more willing or better able to exploit quality investments to realize ideological gains increases her strength, induces her to develop extreme policies, forces her opponent to develop moderate policies, and harms her opponent. If she is the less-engaged entrepreneur, she becomes more likely to be active, whereas if she is already more engaged then she further drives her opponent out of the contest.
A Dominant Entrepreneur We first consider the special case of a dominant entrepreneur in terms of parameters (|x k | ≤ |x −k | and α −k ≤ α k with at least one strict inequality).
Recall that i score-dominates the policy contest if she develops policies that are first-order stochastically better for the decisionmaker, i.e., F i (s) ≤ F −i (s) , ∀s ∈ [0,s] with a strict inequality for some scores. We also say that entrepreneur i is more ideologically aggressive if her policies are first-order stochastically more extreme, i.e., G i (|y|) ≤ G −i (|y|) , ∀y with a strict inequality for some ideologies. These features are characteristic of competition when one entrepreneur is dominant.
Corollary 6 If α −k ≤ α k and |x −k | ≥ |x k | , with at least one inequality strict, then entrepreneur −k is more engaged, score dominant, and more ideologically aggressive.
Greater engagement and score dominance follow from Proposition 3, which states that greater engagement at every probability p, i.e.,
∀p, is a necessary and sufficient condition for score dominance. This holds when −k is both more extreme and has lower costs. First order stochastic dominance of ideologies is then an implication: applying score dominance, entrepreneur −k develops more-extreme policies at every score, i.e.,
s)| ∀s, which, combined with score dominance, implies that she is more ideologically aggressive than her opponent.
The subcase of an entrepreneur who is dominant due to lower costs (α −k < α k ) despite equally-extreme ideological preferences (x k = x −k ) has a natural interpretation. The entrepreneurs may represent two competing factions within a firm or agency. Each leans in favor of one particular approach to a problem, yet one has more staff and money to develop new policy proposals. In these circumstances, the cost-advantaged entrepreneur exploits her advantage to develop policies that reflect her ideological preferences. Interestingly, despite the extremism of her policies, she invests sufficiently in quality to make the decisionmaker probabilistically favor them; she does not overexploit her advantage.
In the subcase of an entrepreneur who is dominant due to a more-extreme ideology (|x −k | > x k ) despite no greater ability to develop quality (α k = α −k ), the model demonstrates that extremism need not be a vice. Greater extremism induces an entrepreneur to value marginal ideological gains more, which incentivizes her to produce higher-quality policies.
Her extremism does not induce her to be excessively aggressive; her policies are first-order stochastically better for the decisionmaker despite their greater extremism, and her extreme preferences (surprisingly) make her more likely to win the contest.
Equally-Engaged Entrepreneurs with Different Motives Next, we consider entrepreneurs who are equally engaged ( k = −k ) but with different primary motives for engagement. Let j have lower costs (α j < α −j ) and −j have more-extreme ideological preferences (|x −j | > |x j |).
For example, j may be a corporate interest group whereas −j is an environmental NGO with limited resources. The groups' equal engagement implies that both are always active. However, their patterns of policy development differ.
Proposition 5 With entrepreneurs who are equally engaged ( j = −j ) but have different primary motives for engagement (α j < α −j and |x −j | > |x j |)
1. the cost-advantaged entrepreneur j is score-dominant and more likely to win 2. the more-extreme entrepreneur −j develops a more-extreme policy y * −j (s) > y * j (s) at every score.
Score dominance of the cost-advantaged entrepreneur follows because they are equally engaged and her cost advantage becomes magnified at higher scores due to the higher likelihood of enjoying the intrinsic benefits of quality. A straightforward consequence is that she is more likely to win the contest.
Demonstrating that the more ideologically-extreme entrepreneur develops more-extreme policies at every score s (i.e., |y −j (s)| =
It is simple to show that she would develop a more ideologically-extreme policy for any fixed probability of winning despite her greater costs (i.e.,
). However, this is counterbalanced by her lower probability of victory at every score. Nevertheless, it can be shown that her tendency toward extremism dominates.
These observations have interesting implications for the decisionmaker's observable choices among the policies that are developed.
Corollary 7 If entrepreneurs are equally engaged but have different primary motives, the decisionmaker appears ideologically biased toward the cost-advantaged entrepreneur:
1. the cost-advantaged entrepreneur wins the contest whenever her policy is equally or more ideologically-extreme than her opponent's 2. the ideologically-motivated entrepreneur sometimes develops a more ideologically-extreme policy that loses the contest 3. the cost-advantage entrepreneur wins with probability > 1 2 . Thus, when the ideology of policies is considered in isolation, the decisionmaker's policy choices appear to be biased towards the entrepreneur with greater resources for policy development. The cost-advantaged entrepreneur tends to win, and is rewarded with victory whenever she develops a policy that is equally or even more ideologically extreme. Conversely, the ideologically-motivated entrepreneur appears to overreach by sometimes developing a more ideologically-extreme policy and losing the contest.
These patterns are consistent with common perceptions about competition between resource-rich interest groups (e.g., firms) and ideologically-motivated ones (e.g., environmental NGOs). However our results are not driven by factors such as backdoor dealings or quid pro quo lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions that could enable corporate interest groups to dominate policy making. Nor do our results stem from irrational behavior by idealistic activists who insist on maintaining ideological purity. Of course, such factors may well contribute to observed patterns of behavior. But our model shows that these patterns can also arise simply due to preference and cost asymmetries between rational actors who make productive investments that improve the quality of their policy proposals.
Major Asymmetries Finally, we consider major asymmetries in parameters, which arise when an entrepreneur has very high or low costs or has very moderate or extreme preferences. We first establish that given any of these sources of asymmetry, the less-engaged entrepreneur k is unlikely to enter the contest. From Corollary 3, we know that her probability of being active is (α −k − 1) 1 |x −k | k − 1 , and this converges to zero as (i) she becomes moderate (|x k | → 0), (ii) her cost of producing quality becomes high (α k → ∞), (iii) her opponent's preferences become extreme (|x −k | → ∞), or (iv) her opponent's net cost of producing quality becomes low (α −k → 1). Thus, equilibrium patterns of activity resemble those of a 1-entrepreneur game in that the more-engaged entrepreneur −k rarely encounters direct competition.
A natural question is whether policy outcomes likewise resemble those of a 1-entrepreneur game. Absent competition, the sole entrepreneur would extract all benefits of quality in the form of ideological gains, leaving the decisionmaker no better off than under the reservation policy. We first show that this is indeed the case when the asymmetry is due to the lessengaged entrepreneur having very moderate preferences or high costs.
Proposition 6 When |x k | → 0 or α k → ∞, the decisionmaker's utility converges to zero.
The scenario of an entrepreneur with very high costs matches Londregan's (2000) characterization of policymaking in Chile, where both the legislature and the president have formal proposal power, but the legislature had few resources for policy development. The predictions of our model in this empirical domain are therefore similar to Londregan's model, in which only the president can develop high-quality policies.
The scenario of a very moderate entrepreneur demonstrates that there is no benefit to the decisionmaker from an entrepreneur who perfectly shares her preferences. Such an entrepreneur stays out of the policy contest because the decisionmaker already represents her interests. The decisionmaker would actually prefer any entrepreneur who will generate competition, however extreme, rather than a replica of herself.
Although the benefits of competitive entrepreneurship vanish when a major asymmetry arises from one entrepreneur's disengagement, our next result demonstrates that this is not the case when it arises from very high engagement of her opponent.
Proposition 7 When |x −k | → ∞ or α −k → 1, the decisionmaker's utility is bounded away from zero.
When the absence of activity by one entrepreneur results from the high engagement of her competitor, the decisionmaker is strictly better off with the possibility of competition.
The reason is simple-the potential for entry by the less-engaged entrepreneur prevents the more-engaged one from developing policies that are no better than the reservation policy.
If she did so, the less-engaged entrepreneur would develop strictly better policies and win.
Potential competition thus prevents even a highly-dominant entrepreneur from extracting all the benefits of quality in the form of ideological gains. This observation is crucial for empirical analyses of competitive policy development-in situations where only one faction routinely develops proposals, it cannot be concluded that its actions are unaffected by potential activity from other interested groups.
Conclusion
This paper extends the competitive policy entrepreneurship model of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) to understand the nature of policy competition between asymmetric factions. In the model, factions have different ideologies or preferences regarding organizational priorities, yet also agree on certain common objectives. Competing policy developers appeal to a decisionmaker by making productive, policy-specific investments to improve the quality of their proposals.
We characterize the equilibrium of the resulting all-pay contest played by two competing entrepreneurs as they generate proposals comprised of two dimensions: ideology and quality.
In the analysis, we also develop techniques that can be applied to other environments in which actors compete to have their preferred policies enacted by exerting costly up-front effort, e.g., Our analysis suggests several avenues for future work. One possibility is to expand the number of possible participants in the contest. This is a natural assumption for organizations in which entrepreneurship occurs at an individual level rather than in teams, or when entrepreneurs come from outside of the organization (e.g., interest groups developing proposals for government policy). It is straightforward to show that when costs are common there always exists an equilibrium in which the two most ideologically-extreme entrepreneurs play their equilibrium strategies in the 2-entrepreneur game, while the others are inactive. Hirsch & Shotts (2015) contains the weaker result for the symmetric model).
A second possible extension would be to allow policy entrepreneurs to buy support using targeted benefits (pork, as in vote buying models), collective benefits (policy quality, as in our model), or both, and then analyze when they use productive investments in high-quality proposals rather than wasteful targeted vote buying.
A third and possibly more interesting avenue is to consider aspects of institutional design in a setting of competitive entrepreneurship. Factors that could be considered our results include subsidies for policy development, endogenous selection of the entrepreneurs, delegation of the decision to a person with different ideological preferences that are more or less aligned with one entrepreneur, or the design of the decisionmaking mechanism.
Policy Entrepreneurship with Asymmetric Competition
Alexander V. Hirsch October 7, 2015 This Appendix is divided into two parts. Appendix A contains proofs for the main propositions in the paper, including the analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium score CDFs contained in Proposition 2. Appendix B proves Lemmas 1 -4 and Proposition 1, which contains necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium of the model.
A Proofs of Main Propositions
Proposition 2 Part 1: We seek a solution to the differential equation in Proposition 1
satisfying the boundary conditions. We rewrite the equation as
which implies
. Letting s i (F i ) denote the inverse of F i (s), observing
, substituting in s i (F i ) for s, and rearranging yields
This is a differential equation on the composite function F −i (s i (F i )) giving entrepreneur −i's probability of developing a policy with score less than the score s i (F i ) associated with
The following function with an arbitrary constant c solves the differential equation:
From Proposition 1, the boundary condition
x i . Substituting and rearranging yields
Finally, substituting F i (s) back in for F i yields
i.e., at every score the probabilities of victory must make the entrepreneurs equally engaged. 
, and hence
.
1 |x i | , we rewrite in terms of the inverse function s ( )
It is then easily verified that
Finally, we set the constant. The score ranges from [0,s] , and score is a decreasing function of engagement, so the maximum engagement * (0) =¯ is associated with the minimum score s = 0. We argue that¯ = min i { i (0)} = k (0). If the maximum engagement were lower, then F i (0) = p −i (¯ ) > p −i ( k (0)) ≥ 0 ∀i and the boundary condition at score 0 fails. If the maximum engagement were higher, then for entrepreneur −k,
The unique solution can be divided up among four additive subterms as
Entrepreneur i's score CDF at s is the unique probability such that −i's engagement equals (s) (the inverse of s ( )), i.e., F i (s) = p −i ( (s)).
Proposition 3 For sufficiency:
Proposition 4 Part 1. We first show the equilibrium score function s * ( ) is increasing in x i and decreasing in α i ∀ . Expressing dependence of equilibrium quantities on parameter
Since the constant is chosen so that s ( k ; q) = k (q) 1 s (ε; q) dε + C (q) = 0 (where k (q) is shorthand for k (0; q))
Combining with (4) yields,
It is straightforward to see that s ( ; q) is strictly increasing in x i and strictly decreasing in α i ; the functions i (p) satisfy the comparative statics (and hence k (0) does), the inverse functions p i (ε) inherit the same comparative statics in q, so (|x i | /α i ) · p i (ε) in the integral also inherits comparative statics, as does the overall expression.
Part 2. A player's utility equals her utility from offerings and the comparative statics follow from Part 1.
Part 3. From the main text, the decisionmaker's equilibrium expected utility is
Using integration by parts and observing that s ( ) = −2 i
dε, which reduces to the expression in the Proposition.
Proposition 5 Part 1. From Proposition 2, j is more engaged at p i.f.f. log (
dq > 0, and by assumption we have equal engagement at p = 0. It is straightforward to show that α j < α −j → ∂ ∂q
2.
3. The log difference is single peaked, since the derivative is
= 1 which happens at most once.
So the entrepreneurs can be equally engaged at most two probabilities, which are p = 0 and p = 1. Entrepreneur j is more engaged in a neighborhood around 0 since the entrepreneurs are equally engaged at 0 and
(the derivative of the log difference is positive at 0); hence she is more engaged at all p ∈ (0, 1).
Part 2. We wish to show
The l.h.s. is strictly greater at = 1 (as p j (1) = p −j (1) = 1 and
) and equal to the r.h.s. at = 0 (as j = −j ). Now we show that the derivative of the l.h.s. is < the derivative of the r.h.s. ∀ < j ; since both sides are decreasing in and equal at j = −j , this proves the desired property. Because ·
The ratio is equal to 1 at j = −j ; hence it is > 1 ∀ < j , implying
Proposition 6 To show DM utility converges to zero, rewrite the max score from Proposi-
, which converges to
Proposition 7 Suppose DM utility converges to zero. Then for any s > 0,
Since −k only develops policies on her side of 0, k s utility from any policy −k develops at a score ≤ŝ is less than −x 2 k +ŝ. Thus, rather than staying out (which k does with strictly positive probability) she could profitably deviate, developing (
improving her utility by at least
B Proofs of Equilibrium Conditions
Lemma 1 Taking the first order condition with respect to y i yields the result.
Lemma 2 Suppose not, i.e., each player's strategy generates an atom of size p i at some common s > 0. Letȳ t denote the expected ideological outcome conditional on the tie at score s (which depends on both players' strategies and the decisionmaker's tiebreaking rule), and also let
}. Entrepreneur i's utility from playing according to her strategy conditional on a tie (which may involve mixing over ideologies) is then
Since the entrepreneurs want to move ideology in strictly opposite directions conditional on a score, V k (s, 0) ≥ V k (s,ȳ t ) for at least one k. Thus, that k's utility from playing according to her strategy conditional on a tie at s is less than or equal to
= y with zero variance maximizes the first line. Moreover since y is weakly better than 0 for k, the above is ≤ lim s k →s + Π k s k , y; σ −k ; but this in turn is strictly < lim s k →s + {Π k (s k , y * k (s) ; σ −k )} (because p −k > 0 implies y = lim s k →s + {y * k (s k )}, so tying must be strictly worse than just winning with (s, y * k (s)).
Lemma 3 Denote entrepreneur i's equilibrium utility as U * i , and suppose not, i.e., F i (0) > 0 ∀i; this could be due to atoms at 0, developing scores lower than 0, or both. Letȳ t denote the expected ideological outcome conditional on both players developing scores ≤ 0, which could be a complicated function of the players' strategies and the decisionmaker's tie-breaking rule. We argue that equilibrium impliesȳ t = 0, so both entrepreneurs have a strict incentive to produce score ε and win with strictly positive probability bounded away from 0.
Entrepreneur i can achieve U * i by mixing according to her strategy conditional on generating score ≤ 0, and utility arbitrarily close to lim s i →0 + {Π i (s i , 0; σ −i )} by developing a policy with ε score and ideology at 0. Equilibrium thus requires that
Equilibrium thus requires that the r.h.s. be ≥ 0 for both entrepreneurs {i, −i}. But this then implies that bothȳ t ≥ 0 andȳ t ≤ 0, soȳ t = 0 and U * i = lim s i →0 + {Π i (s i , 0; σ −i )}. But then by Lemma 1 lim s i →0 + {Π i (s i , y * i (0) ; σ −i )} is strictly higher for both entrepreneurs since y * i (0) = F −i (0) · x i α i = 0, and they each have a strict incentive to deviate to an ε-higher score and produce their optimal ideology, a contradiction.
Lemma 4 We first show that ifŝ > 0 is in the support of F i then F −i (ŝ) − F −i (ŝ − ε) > 0 ∀ε > 0. Suppose not; then ∃ε > 0 such that F −i (s) is constant over [ŝ − ε,ŝ] and −i has no atom atŝ−ε orŝ. Intuitively, this can't happen because i would be playing scores aboveŝ−ε without getting a higher probability of victory. Formally Π i (ŝ, y i ; σ −i ) − Π i (ŝ − ε, y i ; σ −i ) = − (α i − F −i (ŝ))·ε < 0 ∀y i , implying by an envelope argument that i's utility from developing (ŝ − ε, y * (ŝ − ε)) is strictly higher than developing (ŝ, y * (ŝ)); ifŝ were in the support she could do strictly better by deviating to (ŝ − ε, y * (ŝ − ε)), a contradiction. (since otherwise i would be putting positive probability on scores yielding strictly less utility than her equilibrium utility). Now letŷ i = lim s i →ŝ − {y * i (s i )} = 0, i.e., i's optimal ideology if she developed scoreŝ and expected to always lose a tie. It is easily verified that meaning it would yield utility strictly higher than i's equilibrium utility to develop ideologŷ y i and score just aboveŝ to win for sure, a contradiction.
Proposition 1 Necessity: We first argue necessity of ideological optimality. Observe that since the score CDFs are atomless over (0, ∞) and at such scores developing (s i , y * i (s i )) is strictly better than any other policy (by Lemma 1), in equilibrium the probability a policy (s i , y i ) with s i > 0 satisfies y i = y * i (s i ) must be 1. Ideological optimality then immediately follows: if F i (0) = 0 then i's policies are strictly positive score with probability 1, and if F i (0) > 0 then F −i (0) = 0 (by Lemma 3), policies with score s i ≤ 0 both lose for sure and never affect a tie, and therefore must be 0 quality with probability 1.
We next argue necessity of score optimality by deriving the system of differential equations and boundary conditions. Observe that Lemma 4 (combined with our technical restriction that score CDFs be the sum of a discrete and absolutely continuous distribution) immediately imply (i) score CDFs are absolutely continuous over [0,s] , wheres > 0 is the maximum score and may be = ∞, (ii) F k (0) = 0 for some k ∈ {L, R}, and (iii) lim This is an entrepreneur's expected utility were she always to win at a score-tie (with her opponent or the reservation policy) with the policies y 0) -then by the boundary conditions her opponent −i is always active (F i (0) = 0). As previously argued, if she develops a negative score policy it always loses, and never influences a tie. Thus, 0-quality negative score policies yield exactly her equilibrium utilityÛ * i , while positive-quality negative score policies are strictly worse.
Finally suppose that entrepreneur i is always active (F i (0) = 0). If her opponent −i is also always active, then the same argument applies, so suppose that her opponent is sometimes inactive (F −i (0) > 0). By ideological optimality, whenever −i develops a 0−score policy it is exactly the reservation policy. Thus, were i to deviate to developing a strictly negative score policy s i < 0 it would always lose and never influence a (real) tie, so it is weakly or strictly worse than developing the reservation policy (0, 0) (depending on whether it has positive quality). Last we argue that U * i is ≥ i's utility from developing any policy (0, y i ), including the reservation policy. Let w i (y i ) denote the probability policy (0, y i ) wins conditional on −i being inactive (s −i ≤ 0), which depends on the full profile of strategies (including the DM's tie-breaking rule). With the remaining probability the reservation policy must be selected. Now observe the following. First, this utility is larger at the reservation policy (0, 0) than at any (0, y i ) with sign (y i ) = sign (x i ). Second, at any y i with sign (y i ) = sign (x i ) (or y i = 0), the above is ≤ the utility Π * i (s i , y i ; F ) from developing (0, y i ) and winning for sure when s −i ≤ 0. Third, by Lemma 1 Π * i (s i , y i ; F ) ≤ Π * i (0; F ), or i's utility if she were to develop a 0−score policy with the optimal ideology presuming she would always win a tie. Finally, CDFs satisfying score optimality are right continuous, so i's equilibrium utility U * i is equal to Π * i (0; F ); thus, no (0, y i ) or (s i , y i ) with s i < 0 yields a profitable deviation.
